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UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN DOCTOR MORAL HAZARD 
BEHAVIOUR IN RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT HEALTHCARE 
REFORM
Yaohui Wang1, Lina He2, Quanlong Liu1, Xinchun Li1
Abstract: Doctor moral hazard has a significant effect on the doctor-patient relationship, increases the cost of healthcare, and 
introduces medical risks. It is a global concern. Doctor moral hazard behaviour is evolving in response to China’s healthcare reform 
program which was inaugurated in 2009.A scientific understanding of doctor behaviour would facilitate the prevention and control of 
doctor moral hazard behaviour. This study used the principles and methodology of Glaser and Strauss’s grounded theory. Theoretical 
and snowball samplings were used to identify 60 subjects. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with each subject. 
Themes were identified through substantial (open) coding and theoretical coding. Six types of doctor moral hazard behaviour were 
extracted from the data. A behavioural model was described and diagrammed to provide a conceptual framework of current doctor 
moral hazard behaviour. The conceptual model of doctor moral hazard behaviour can be used in several ways to correct or prevent 
undesirable actions. Rules governing hospital procedures can be strengthened and enforced by supervision and punishment; the 
asymmetry of information between doctor and patient can be reduced; patient participation in treatment decisions can be increased; 
the effectiveness of medical ethics education can be improved.
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Entendiendo los cambios en el riesgo moral del comportamiento médico en respuesta a la reforma de atención de salud del 
gobierno
Resumen: Para un médico, el riesgo moral tiene un efecto significativo en la relación médico-paciente, incrementa el costo de 
la atención de salud e introduce riesgos en la salud. Se trata de una preocupación global. El riesgo moral del comportamiento 
médico ha evolucionado en respuesta al programa de reforma de atención de salud del gobierno de China, inaugurado en 2009. 
Un entendimiento científico del comportamiento de los médicos facilitaría la prevención y el control del riesgo moral. El presente 
estudio usa los principios y metodología de la teoría fundamentada de Glaser y Strauss. Se usaron muestras teóricas y multiplicativas 
para identificar 60 sujetos y realizar entrevistas semiestructuradas en profundidad. Los temas se identificaron mediante codificación 
sustancial abierta y teórica. De los datos se extrajeron seis tipos de riesgo moral del comportamiento médico. Se describió y diagramó 
un modelo de comportamiento para proporcionar una estructura conceptual del riesgo moral del comportamiento médico actual. 
El modelo conceptual de riesgo moral del comportamiento médico puede usarse de varias maneras para corregir o prevenir acciones 
no deseadas. Las normas procedimentales de los hospitales pueden fortalecerse y exigirse mediante supervisión y castigo; se puede 
reducir la asimetría de la información que se da entre el médico y el paciente, incrementar la participación del paciente en decisiones 
de tratamiento y mejorar la efectividad en la educación en ética médica.
Palabras clave: riesgo moral, comportamiento, teoría fundamentada, médico, entrevistas semiestructuradas en profundidad
Compreendendo mudanças no comportamento de risco moral médico em resposta a reforma governamental de cuidados à 
saúde
Resumo: Risco moral médico tem um efeito significativo na relação médico-paciente, aumenta o custo dos cuidados à saúde e 
introduz riscos médicos. É uma preocupação global. Comportamento de risco moral médico vem se desenvolvendo em resposta ao 
programa de reforma de cuidados à saúde da China, que se iniciou em 2009. Uma compreensão científica do comportamento médico 
facilitaria a prevenção e controle do comportamento de risco moral médico. Este estudo utilizou os princípios da metodologia da 
Teoria Fundamentada de Glaser e Strauss.  Amostragem teóricas e por bola de neve foram utilizadas para identificar 60 participantes. 
Entrevistas detalhadas semi-estruturadas foram realizadas com cada participante. Temas foram identificados através de codificação 
(aberta) substancial e codificação teórica. Seis tipos de comportamento de risco moral médico foram obtidos dos dados. Um modelo 
comportamental foi descrito e diagramado de forma a fornecer um enquadre conceitual do comportamento de risco moral médico. 
O modelo conceitual de comportamento de risco moral médico pode ser utilizado de diversas formas para corrigir ou prevenir 
ações indesejáveis. Regras que governam procedimentos em hospitais podem ser fortalecidas e reforçadas por supervisão e punição; 
a assimetria de informações entre médicos e pacientes pode ser reduzida; a participação dos pacientes nas decisões sobre tratamento 
pode ser aumentada; e a efetividade da educação ética médica pode ser melhorada.
Palavras chave: risco moral, comportamento, Teoria Fundamentada, médico, entrevistas detalhadas semi-estruturadas
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Introduction
Moral hazard is inevitable in healthcare services 
because of information asymmetry. Generally 
speaking, moral hazard includes both the moral 
hazards of the demander and the supplier(1). The 
central agent in supplier moral hazard is the doc-
tor. Doctor moral hazard has led to rapid growth 
in medical costs in various countries. For exam-
ple, healthcare expenditure in the United States 
rose from 26.9 billion USD in 1960 to 1,149.1 
billion USD in 1988, accounting for 14% of 
GDP(2).On 23 March 2010, President Barack 
Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act to reduce the costs of health-
care for both individuals and the government(3). 
Doctor moral hazard is generally believed to be 
caused by information asymmetry, opportunity 
and self-rationalisation(4). Arrow suggested that 
the concept of moral hazard could be applied to 
healthcare in 1963. He observed that the diffe-
rences in patient health could be accurately asses-
sed by doctors, due to their professional training, 
and that doctors were also capable of creating de-
mand for medical services(5). For example, a doc-
tor could ask a patient to undergo expensive tests. 
In medical insurance, the moral hazard of health-
care providers is the opportunistic behaviour by 
which, driven by their own economic interests, 
they take advantage of the information they pos-
sess and thus increase the cost of medicine. 
The theory of information economics shows 
that moral hazard is an opportunistic behaviour. 
Doctors’ moral hazard refers to opportunistic be-
haviour that maximises the interests of doctors 
while might damage those of patients. Some re-
searchers also contend that doctors’ moral hazard 
refers to doctors’ induced demand. For example, 
research has shown that moral hazard in healthca-
re is concentrated around medication, hospitali-
sation, and patient examinations(6). Evans found 
that doctor moral hazard was manifest in exami-
nations, medication and fees, such as unnecessary 
or expensive examinations, and expensive or ove-
rused medications(7). Later research showed that 
overcharging and receiving monetary gifts, which 
are not treatment-related activities, were part of 
doctor moral hazard(8). Doctor moral hazard is 
primarily explained by information asymmetry, 
opportunity, and self-rationalization and it di-
rectly leads to increased medical costs. At present, 
there is limited detailed research on individual 
doctor behaviour regarding doctor moral hazard. 
Some doctors’ moral hazard behaviours have not 
been studied, such as doctors ‘reduction in stan-
dards for surgical indications, excessive use of sur-
gical consumables in violation of treatment prin-
ciples, and other malpractices. Thus, as an activity 
that is evolving, doctors’ moral hazard behaviour 
needs to be studied.
In April 2009, China initiated a medical reform 
policy and introduced a series of measures that 
were intended to rebuild the healthcare system 
and emphasise the government’s leadership of pu-
blic welfare. The control of medical expenditure 
and the supervision of medical activity have gra-
dually become the focus of medical reform. The 
U.S. government similarly proposed a health care 
reform plan in 2010 to resolve the problems of ra-
pidly increasing medical costs and greater health 
safety risks(3). These problems are also related to 
medical practice and doctor moral hazard.
Doctor behaviour has changed subtly as more 
attention has been paid to doctor moral hazard. 
Health authorities and social security departments 
have increasingly supervised medical practices. 
Hospital assessment has gradually incorporated 
the examination of items such as average drug 
costs, duration of hospitalisation and inspection 
costs. Medical reform has reached a crucial stage. 
The key to the eventual success of medical reform 
initiatives is the behaviour of medical practitio-
ners. If doctor moral hazard cannot be identified 
and controlled, it will be impossible to achieve 
substantial reform. It is therefore of great impor-
tance to conduct scientific research into doctor 
moral hazard in order to identify its mechanisms 
and develop appropriate prevention measures.
Doctors benefit from a high degree of informa-
tion asymmetry, which enables them to adjust 
their specific moral hazard behaviour in different 
policy environments. There are no universal hy-
potheses of doctor moral hazard, and there has 
been limited research into it. Grounded theory is 
a qualitative research method created (or disco-
vered) by Glaser and Strauss(9). It possesses the 
simplicity of traditional quantitative research and 
over comes the limitations of traditional qualita-
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tive research. The purpose of this study is to con-
duct a qualitative study of doctor moral hazard 
behaviour using grounded theory methods and 
techniques in order to gain a thorough and com-
prehensive understanding of the characteristics 
and changes in doctor moral hazard as medical 
reform progresses. This will enable us to identify 
ways to correct and control behaviour that serves 
doctor moral hazard(10).
This paper describes the internal structures of doc-
tor moral hazard and identifies it by using groun-
ded theory and qualitative research methods to 
create non-structural questionnaires to guide in-
depth interviews for classical samples.
Methods
Pandit divides the process following grounded 
theory into nine steps and groups them into five 
phases: review and discussion of relevant literatu-
re; case selection; development of strict data co-
llection protocol; data collection; data ordering; 
data analysis of the first case; theoretical sampling; 
reaching closure; and comparison of the newly 
constructed theory with existing theories(11). 
We used theoretical sampling as the basis of data 
collection. Theoretical sampling depends on the 
research goal and is part of grounded theory. A 
few initial sample cases are selected and explored 
in depth. The samples are considered to be richly 
representative data sources; this distinguishes the 
method from the large-scale random sampling 
commonly used in quantitative studies(12). The 
grounded theory requires that the theoretical 
samples must have breadth and depth of data, 
and research objectives may be changed dyna-
mically according to the sample data until data 
decoding reaches some degree of saturation(13).
There are different conceptions of doctor moral 
hazard among patients, nurses, doctors and ma-
nagers. There are young doctors and veteran ex-
perts who may have retired. There are small and 
large hospitals which differ in the services offered. 
We selected a range of interviewees from across 
these categories. The size of the sample was de-
termined by theoretical saturation (i.e., sampling 
until a new sample no longer provides new infor-
mation). We conducted in-depth interviews with 
60 interviewees from September 2018 to Decem-
ber 2018. Interviewee characteristics are given in 
Table 1.
Table 1 Characteristics of interviewees.
Category Number Percentage (%)
Sex Male 36 60
Female 24 40
Age <25 years old 10 16.7
26–35 years old 24 40
36–45 years old 12 20
>46 years old 14 23.3
Job seniority <3 years 0 0
3–10 years 18 30
10–20 years 30 50
>20 years 12 20
Educational 
background
Medical doctor 10 16.7
Postgraduate 12 20
Undergraduate 24 40
Other 14 13.3
Hospital 
grade 
Tertiary 24 40
Secondary 18 30
First 18 30
Job/role Doctor 24 40
Management 10 16.7
Nurse 6 10
Patient and family 20 33.3
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doctor moral hazard? 
Apart from well-known doctor moral hazard acti-
vity, do you know any new types of doctor moral 
hazard activity?
What do you think are the types of doctor moral 
hazard behaviour? 
What do you think are the inherent logical re-
lationships among types of doctor moral hazard 
behaviour? 
During the interview, we asked the interviewees 
to elaborate or explain their responses and some 
key points.
We adopted a face-to-face approach in the in-
depth interviews, intending to gain the trust of 
the interviewees through face-to-face communi-
cation and thereby encouraging the interviewees 
to express their thoughts without reservation. We 
also recorded the interviews to observe the facial 
expressions and body language of the interviewees 
and thereby gained insight into their psychology. 
The interview lasted for at least one hour to en-
sure the quality of the interview. After each inter-
view, the researchers reflected on the interview to 
determine the direction of the next sample and 
recorded their observations and conclusions.
Findings
1. Open coding
Data gathered in the study were encoded using 
the qualitative data analysis tool NVivo11, which 
has considerable functionality to help resear-
chers systematically collate and analyse unstruc-
Three days before the interview, we contacted the 
interviewees by telephone, email, WeChat (a mo-
bile instant text and voice messaging communica-
tion service that has become an important social 
media platform in China) door-to-door visit, or 
other means to inform them of the purpose, for-
mat and topic of the interview. We also used this 
preliminary contact between the researchers and 
the interviewees to eliminate any communication 
obstacles(14),. The interviewees were prompted 
to summarise and reflect on their own work or 
patient experience and prepare for the interviews. 
The effectiveness of the formal interview can be 
ensured by the preliminary preparation for the in-
terview, and a confirmation of the time and place 
can ensure the smooth progress of the formal in-
terview.
During the formal interview, the researcher ex-
plained the concept of doctor moral hazard and 
the associated behaviours before conducting an 
in-depth interview. Doctor moral hazard is a sen-
sitive issue among doctors. To ensure that doctors 
could discuss the issue honestly and not inten-
tionally conceal relevant information, we used a 
question-changing technique in the interview. 
We collected the information we needed indi-
rectly by presenting opinions from other hospi-
tals and other medical practitioners (whom the 
interviewee knew) about the factors that influen-
ce doctor moral hazard(15). The main interview 
questions were as follows:
What do you know about doctor moral hazard 
and related behaviour in the context of the newly-
introduced healthcare reforms? 
Do you know any patients who have encountered 
Table 2 Concepts and categories derived by open coding.
Number Categories Concepts Frequency
a1 Lack of timely 
observation
Doctors seldom come to ward rounds after surgery, and the wound 
infection is unknown. The wound is too tight, and doctors do not 
give decompression measures in time.
52
a2 Expanding the 
indication scope
Such nodules do not require surgery abroad. Some of these surgeries 
could have been replaced with less invasive treatment that produced 
equally good results.
33
a3 Using irrelevant 
drugs
It does not matter whether the drug is used or not. This medication 
does not have an effect. Side effects are ignored, or patients are not 
aware of them.
24
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a4 Overuse This cannot be strictly used according to regulations. The number 
of times the drug is used is strictly limited, but the actual number of 
times doctors have used it has exceeded the limits.
60
a5 Violating the 
core medical 
system
A consultation isnot suggested in time, and a conference is missed. 
Failure to report to the senior doctor in time worsened the illness. 
Case discussion among all personnel in the hospital that should have 
been organised doesnot occur.
31
a6 Introducing new 
technology
Recommending minimally invasive techniques that have not been 
widely taught domestically. Intentionally saying that the disease 
requires an unconventional surgical path.
45
a7 Preferential use 
of imported 
consumables.
Doctors say imported consumables are of good quality and 
domestically produced ones are prone to problems or have an 
inadequate service life.
28
a8 Receiving gift 
money
Patients will greatly benefit from giving doctors monetary gifts before 
surgery, including the appropriate operation time and sequence. 
Doctors who do not receive monetary gifts will not perform surgery.
28
a9 Inclination to 
perform surgery 
surgery
Doctors do not recommend conservative treatment. The hospital 
suggests surgery, emphasising that surgery is better than the 
conservative treatment. Doctors show great enthusiasm for surgery 
when discussing treatment options.
32
a10 Inclination 
to prescribe 
imported and 
expensive drugs
The reasons for using expensive drugs are rarely explained in detail. 
Expensive drugs are often used before being identified. You will never 
know the reason unless you ask about it. Although we ask for advice, 
we actually had no choice.
34
a11 Drug overuse Preference to prescribe more medication. When discharged from the 
hospital, patients are still required to take more medication and take 
it for a long time.
44
a12 Consumables 
overuse
Consumables are not neededaccording to treatment needs. More 
consumables are used on the grounds of satisfying basic medical care.
23
a13 Examination 
upgrading
In addition to basic examinations, higher-level examinations are 
required to review a case. Even if the diagnosis is confirmed, a more 
thorough examination will be required for an exclusive diagnosis.
52
a14 Frequent 
examination
Unnecessary examinations are repeated. 23
a15 Extension of 
hospital stay
The patient who could have been discharged from the hospital earlier 
still occupies a bed. Doctors do not want beds to be vacant. They will 
not consider discharging patients from the hospital until new in-
patients are admitted.
48
a16 Lowering the 
hospitalisation 
standard
For a disease like this, it does not matter whether the patient 
needshospitalisation. There are vacant beds, and doctors must fill 
them up.
32
a17 Inadequate 
sterilising
Doctors do not disinfect themselves or equipment according to 
protocol. Disinfection is not complete, or the disinfection quality is 
bad.
29
a18 Irrelevant 
examinations
Some examination procedures are unnecessary; they are explained 
by doctors as a group of examinations as if they are required by 
government regulations. As soon as a patient is admitted to the 
hospital, a lot of inexplicable examinations are given.
32
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3. Selective coding and model building
Further analysis, based on the results of selecti-
ve coding, showed that dereliction of duty covers 
all the behavioural characteristics associated with 
doctor moral hazard. Doctor behaviour acts aga-
inst patient interests when doctors maximise 
their own interests. Such behaviour includes not 
changing equipment, not disinfecting or sterili-
sing themselves or their equipment according to 
protocols, and receiving monetary gifts despite 
prohibitive regulations, violating the core medical 
doctor-patient relationship. These kinds of doctor 
behaviour are of general importance. The other 
five kinds of doctor behaviour are associated with 
excessive treatment, including over-examination 
of patients, unnecessarily prolonged hospitalisa-
tion, overuse of consumables and inappropriate 
medication or overmedication. 
The key to altering these behaviours is to review 
the treatment process; that is, to monitor whether 
the process conforms to medical protocols and to 
review the necessity of each procedure. Beginning 
with the admission of a patient, the first problem 
to address is excessive examinations. Doctors 
need to make many kinds of examination in diag-
tured data. Encoding is part of grounded theory 
methodology. Using the software, 60 cases of res-
pondents and 285 reference points were coded. 
After deletion and merging, 151 initial concepts 
were obtained, and 18 categories (a1–a18) were 
obtained after induction and sorting (Table 2). 
Six main categories (A1–A6) were further obtai-
ned by selective coding based on the structure, 
context and type relationships (Table 3). We dis-
cussed theories and practice during the coding 
process with experts to avoid subjective bias and 
predetermined conclusions.
2. Selective coding
We reviewed and scrutinised each category, and 
on the basis of medical practice, we extracted six 
main categories (excessive examinations, excessi-
ve medications, excessive consumables, excessive 
hospitalisation, excessive surgery and dereliction 
of duty). It should note that as the most impor-
tant concern for hospitalised patients is excessive 
surgery, it is considered to be the core and selec-
tive coding higher category shown in the table. 
We analysed the behaviour characteristic of all six 
main categories (Table 3). 
Table 3 Main categories of open coding.
Main category Category Frequency Percentage
A1 Dereliction of duty
a1 Lack of timely observation  
a4 Overuse  
a5 Violating the core medical system  
a8 Receiving gift money 
a17 Inadequate sterilising
28 22.8
A2 Excessive surgery 
a2 Expanding the indication scope  
a6 Introducing new technology  
a9 Inclination to perform surgery surgery
22 17.9
A3 Excessive examination
a13 Examination upgrading  
a14 Frequent examination  
a18 Irrelevant examinations
18 14.6
A4 Excessive medication
a3 Using irrelevant drugs  
a10 inclination to prescribe imported and expensive 
drugs  
a11 Drug overuse
25 20.3
A5 Excessive consumables
a7 Preferential use of imported consumables  
a12 Consumables overuse 18 14.6
A6 Excessive hospitalisation
a15 Extension of hospital stay  
a16 Lowering the hospitalisation standard 12 9.8
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nosis and treatment, but not all examinations are 
necessary. After an initial examination, doctors 
should evaluate whether a patient is an outpa-
tient or an inpatient. During our interviews, me-
dical personnel of large general hospitals talked 
about the relaxation of hospitalisation indicators 
in primary medical institutions. Patients who 
could have been treated as outpatients were ad-
mitted to hospital for treatment. After a patient 
was admitted, medical staff preferred surgery over 
conservative treatment. For example, the case of 
trauma patients was mentioned in an interview. 
Although the medical practitioners suggested sur-
gical treatment, patients recovered well through 
less invasive treatment. This situation indicates 
potential doctor moral hazard. If a doctor’s re-
commendation of surgery is followed, the pa-
tient would require surgical materials, narcotic 
drugs, and rehabilitation treatment after surgery. 
This shows that there are problems of excessive 
treatment: overmedication, unnecessary exami-
nations, and surgery. Figure 2 shows how exces-
sive procedures are linked to dereliction of duty.
Discussion
We used grounded theory (analysis, comparison 
and concentration of the original data, categori-
sation, and integration of the concepts that were 
identified) to extract six core aspects of doctor 
moral hazard. The unifying concept is dereliction 
of duty, which is manifest as unnecessary surgery, 
leading to excessive medication, unnecessary exa-
minations, overuse of consumables, and needless 
hospitalisation. Doctor behaviour associated with 
moral hazard has greatly changed when compa-
red to moral hazard behaviour described in the 
literature(16).Doctor moral hazard previously in-
cluded excessive medication, unnecessary patient 
tests, and lengthy hospitalisation. However, as the 
medical reforms have been implemented in Chi-
na and government supervision of medical prac-
tice has increased, unnecessary surgery, overuse of 
consumables, and probable malfeasance in doc-
tor behaviour have also increased, because these 
behaviours are relatively more difficult to iden-
tify and control. This trend indicates that doctor 
moral hazard behaviour is changing in ways that 
make it less significant and more sophisticated. 
Three aspects of this trend confirm the accuracy 
of previous research, but we suggest there are new 
behaviours engendered by the implementation of 
the reform program.
Doctor behaviour is constantly adjusted. Doc-
tors recognise changes in healthcare policy and 
covertly alter their behaviour. China’s healthca-
re reforms had an effecting controlling the ave-
rage length of stay, the administration of drugs, 
and total medical expenses. However, due to the 
pressures of increased supervision, tense doctor-
patient relationships, and the high incidence of 
injuries requiring medical intervention, doctor 
behaviour has evolved. Increased government su-
pervision has resulted in doctors becoming less 
straightforward and more circumspect when in-
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teracting with their patient interactions. Doctor 
behaviour has also changed from being safe and 
risk-free to less safe and riskier.
1. Excessive examination
Doctors make many kinds of examinations in 
the process of diagnosis and treatment, but not 
all examinations given are necessary. One doctor 
mentioned in the interview that if adequate exa-
minations are not given, a patient would com-
plain when a condition is not correctly diagno-
sed and even sue the hospital for compensation, 
on the grounds of delayed treatment(17). The 
same doctor observed that a patient hopes to get 
an adequate examination when seeing a doctor. 
Some examinations are by nature exclusory and 
thus have a Low positive outcome rate and may 
be considered to be excessive examinations by pa-
tients. Patient interviews showed that excessive 
examinations are common. If doctors are com-
municative and can obtain patient consent, pa-
tients would accept the examinations. Of course, 
some patients even ask for more tests to get their 
physical condition.
2. Excessive medication
Interviews with hospital employees and nursing 
staff indicated that doctors tend to prescribe and 
use expensive drugs, overprescribe and overu-
se drugs, and even prescribe and use prohibited 
drugs. Interviews with patients showed that the 
most unacceptable doctor behaviour is to prescri-
be drugs that should not be administered or that 
have side effects. Sometimes, when a doctor pres-
cribes expensive drugs over cheaper equivalent 
drugs or overprescribe drugs, the patients would 
think that they could benefit from the medica-
tion and so they are not greatly opposed to these 
practices(18).
3. Excessive consumables
The overuse of consumables is similar to the 
overuse of medication. Interviews with hospital 
employees and nursing staff showed that doctors 
prefer or overuse expensive consumables. Inter-
views with patients showed that the most unac-
ceptable behaviour for patients was that doctors 
deliberately overused consumables, such as stents 
and other auxiliary consumables, which do not 
improve the patient’s condition and even have 
potential side effects. However, patients were not 
opposed to the use of some expensive consuma-
bles that might benefit them.
4. Dereliction of duty
Dereliction of duty covers all the characteristics 
of doctor moral hazard behaviour. Doctor moral 
hazard results from doctors taking actions that are 
against patients’ interests when, for example, the 
doctor maximises their own returns by not chan-
ging equipment and disinfecting or sterilising 
according to protocols, receiving money contrary 
to regulations, and perverting the delivery of core 
medical services.
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5. Excessive surgery
Given a choice between conservative treatment 
and surgery, doctors and other medical practitio-
ners prefer surgery. Induced demand is a recogni-
sed phenomenon: surgeons naturally give priority 
to surgery for the sake of business. In the case of 
trauma patients, discussed in the interviews, doc-
tors and medical staff suggest surgery. However, 
patients can recover from trauma through conser-
vative treatment(19).
6. Excessive hospitalisation
After an examination, doctors would assess 
whether the patient can be treated as an outpatient 
or an inpatient. During our interviews, medical 
professionals in large general hospitals mentioned 
that the admittance requirements were relaxed in 
primary medical institutions. Patients who could 
have been treated as outpatients in the clinic were 
admitted to the hospital for treatment, suggesting 
the effects of doctor moral hazard. This kind of 
doctor moral hazard is often accompanied by ex-
cessive surgery.
Scientific knowledge of doctor moral hazard be-
haviour enables us to better study the manifesta-
tion of doctor moral hazard at micro-level (i.e., 
the factors that induce an individual doctor’s be-
haviour) and how to formulate management cou-
ntermeasures to prevent and control doctor moral 
hazard, thereby providing guidance to alleviate 
the imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship. 
Scientific understanding of doctor moral hazard 
can also provide a basis for the next macro-level 
reform of medicine and healthcare.
Conclusion
We used grounded theory to systematically study 
doctor moral hazard behaviour in the context of 
government medical reforms. The theory enabled 
us to develop a new interpretation of doctor mo-
ral hazard behaviour. Doctor behaviour has chan-
ged considerably from that described in the lite-
rature(20). Since the introduction of medical re-
form in China, behaviours described in previous 
literature are still practised, but new forms of be-
haviour have emerged. Current doctor moral ha-
zard behaviour falls into six categories: dereliction 
of duty, excessive surgery, excessive examination 
and testing, excessive medication, excessive use of 
consumables, and excessive hospitalisation.
Accurate knowledge of doctor moral hazard beha-
viour and the trends of its change can be applied 
in many fields. In terms of laws, regulations and 
protocols, we must increase policing of the rules 
and punish unwanted behaviour to prevent the 
evolution of behaviours that emerge in response 
to the lack of regulatory enforcement. In terms of 
hospital management, we must reduce informa-
tion asymmetry and increase patient’s participa-
tion by redesigning system and process. We must 
also improve education in medical ethics so that 
medical practitioners can recognise doctor moral 
hazard behaviour and understand its consequen-
ces, thereby avoiding it. This is particularly im-
portant when the moral hazard affects the health 
of patient. Finally, we must make it harder for 
doctors to rationalise their moral hazard beha-
viour.
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